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A high-altitude nuclear explosion produces electrons which may be caught 
by the Earth's magnetic field and convert their energy into radio waves. The 
net effect is a microsecond burst of intense, broad frequency radio wave 
energy, Which is one form of an Electromagnetic Pulse or EMP. Although EMP 
does not threaten living things, it can disrupt or destroy unprotected solid 
state electronics, including those used i radio and telephone services, 
computers and computer magnetic memory banks, aircraft instrumentation and 
flight controls, ignition and control modu1e.s in automobiles, protective 
devices Which sustain electric power distribution in the United States, and 
satellites and their ground stations. At issue is the vulnerability of the 
Nation and the measures that can be implemented to minimize the damage that 
can be caused by EMP. 
BACKGROUND 
History 
The high-altitude EMP was first encountered during nuclear testing over 
Johnson Island in the Pacific in 1958. During this test period, 1958-1963, 
EMP was not a threat to the relatively primitive vacuum tube electronics nor 
to the electromechanical relays of telephone systems. It was regarded as a 
mystery and an "interference." In 1962 the Rand Corporation in California 
published an explanation of how the pulse was generated along with its 
approximate magnitude. 
Electronic vulnerability to the EMP emerged in the next decade with the 
electronic revolution which began in the early 1960s. The vacuum tube era 
gave way to solid state electronics. Only milliwatts of power could perform 
electronic tasks which required watts using the older technology. 
As efficiency rose, sensitivity to transient surges of current also rose. 
The solid state circuitry, almost universal by 1970, proved to be a thousand 
to a million times a s  easily damaged by an EMP as the older vacuum tube 
technology. 
The growth of understanding within the military establishment of EMP 
effects as well as the problems of EMP countermeasures is revealed in the 
history of the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM), a system of radars, 
computers, and nuclear-armed interceptor missiles to have been deployed at 
twelve sites across the United States starting in the early 1970s. As an 
understanding of EMP developed in the military, protective measures 
("hardening") and EMP simulation equipment became a major cost in the 
Safeguard project. Although the missiles and ground control systems were 
hardened, the possibility was recognized that the e ~ p 1 0 ~ i O n  from the 
Safeguard or Soviet nuclear warhead might isolate the sPte from all 
communication. Essential links to NORAD (the North American Defense Command) 
and NORADvs links to the President could be terminated by the pulse. The 
extent to which Safeguard might impair the overall defensive capability 
remained a debate throughout the life of the project (1969-1976). 
Ironically, the threat posed by Safeguard was significantly reduced by the 
May 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty with the' Soviet Union. The treaty 
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permitted two ABM sites; a 1974 protocol to the treaty reduced that number to 
one. A single Safeguard base became operational in April 1975 but closed in 
February 1976, primarily due to concern that the utility of a single ABM site 
could be nullified by the growing Soviet missile force. Concern over the 
loss of communications to EMP remained. 
Solid state electronics initiated several trends in the early 1960s which 
began to accelerate and still continue to do so today. Circuitry is now more 
Compact by six or seven orders of magnitude compared to vacuum tube 
technology. Power consumption has decreased by a similar. amount. The cost 
of circuitry has also decreased by five t o  six orders of magnitude. This 
combination of factors has led to a geometric growth of tasks and 
capabilities. Small electronic chips now control and monitor vehicle 
engines, provide instrument displays, and provide $20.00 pocket calculators 
the mathematical power that would have cost over a million dollars in the 
late 1950s. They control and program factory machines, home kitchen 
equipment, toys and games. 
Along with this revolution their sensitivity to transient charges of 
electricity has risen in about the same proportion. Modern circuitry is 
about a million times as easily destroyed by an EMP as the older vacuum tube 
systems. This sensitivity may be expected to rise steadily along with growth 
of the role played by electronics. 
The EMP Phenomenon 
The gamma ray flash from a high-altitude nuclear explosion produces a 
spherical wave front. The portion of this sphere expanding toward the Earth 
impacts the upper atmosphere tearing loose a heavy charge of electrons. The 
free electrons are immediately captured by the Earth's magnetic field. They 
dissipate their velocity by spinning around the magnetic field lines, 
converting their energy into radio waves. The--net effect is a microsecond 
burst of intense, broad frequency radio wave energy, which is one form of an 
Electromagnetic Pulse or EMP. 
Since the EMP contains a broad spectrum of frequencies, an electrical 
conductor of any length can serve as an antenna. The heaviest jolt is 
received from the electrical service lines. However, wiring internal to 
electronic equipment also receives and conducts the surge directly into the 
circuitry. 
The disruptive capability of the EMP is due more to its shape than to the 
total energy it contains. The duration of the pulse is about a millionth of 
a second (a microsecond) but the peak power density is nearly instantaneous 
-- a few billionths of a second (about 10 nanoseconds). The total energy 
received from a nominal one-megaton burst above the atmosphere is small -- 
about half a joule per square meter. The peak power --density, however, 
reaches 6 megawatts per square meter. The onset of the peak power density is 
a hundred times more rapid than that of lightning. AS a consequence, 
conventional lightning surge protective devices are not effective against the 
EMP. 
Any electrical conductor may serve as an antenna for the pulse, even short 
lengths of internal wire. All electronic circuitry more advanced than that 
using vacuum tubes may be affected by the pulse. This may include all 
communication networks, transmitters and receivers, and all telephone systems 
except those in which glass fiber has been substituted for wire. Computers 
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may be destroyed and magnetic tapes and discs erased. Machines and vehicles 
which employ electronic modules in their operation would be disabled. 
Electronic instruments such as aircraft NAVCOM and flignt control systems may 
be destroyed. 
Satellites exposed to the expanding spherical wave front of gamma and 
x-rays could also receive a crippling or destructive EMP. The radiation 
could free electrons from the metal skin of the satellite, creating an 
electric charge. The intensity of the charge could reach a million volts per 
meter. The electronic payload would then receive large induced currents, not 
unlike a lightning strike. This effect i s  called a system-generated EMP or 
SGEMP. 
Protection or hardening against SGEMP presents a problem which is not 
entirely solved. Even a double walled satellite would not be immune to a 
pulse strong enough to induce a charge in the inner shell. A single nuclear 
warhead could Conceivably disable all satellites not shielded by the Earth. 
This would include synchronous, as well as low altitude civil and military 
satellites. Defensive systems such as laser battle stations and offensive 
systems such as killer satellites or enroute missiles could also be disabled 
or damaged by the SGEMP. 
The Effect of EMP 
A nuclear explosion 150 miles above the geographic center of the country 
is too distant to inflict direct damage or threaten life. However, at this 
altitude, the expanding sphere of gamma radiation would excite a lens shaped 
segment of the upper atmosphere several thousand square miles in area. The 
resulting EMP would cover most of the United States. 
Large-scale power blackouts could occur. Power plants could automatically 
shut down as the pulse triggered fault sensors. The power distribution grid 
would then be imbalanced causing many more generating facilities to shut down 
in response to surges and overloads. However, with no additional EMP's, 
power distribution could be restored in a matter of hours or a day. 
More serious would be the destruction of electronic circuitry. On line 
equipment would receive the EMP through the electrical service connection. 
New equipment in stores or warehouses would receive the pulse through wire 
leads which would serve as antennae. 
In brief the main effects of the EMP would be temporary, large-scale power 
losses followed by longer-duration communications effects. Computer 
dependent banking functions, air fleet operations, and surface transportation 
systems could all be affected. There are concerns that defensive and 
retaliatory capability as well a s  the operation .of military communication 
systems could also be disrupted. 
Protection from the EMP 
The word "harden," borrowed from the military, has'come to mean "protect." 
For example, a computer which has been "hardened" is shielded or otherwise 
protected against the EMP. Protection from the pulse is simple in principle. 
Conductors such as power cables or antenna leads may be fitted with surge 
arrestors or filters designed specifically for the fast rise time of the 
pulse. Other than this, the equipment may be either encased in metal (a 
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Faraday Shield) or simply taken deep underground. New equipment, stores, and 
spares could be protected by the use of a continuous metal covering, possibly 
a foil, applied as part of the packaging process. 
Some protection for large open networks such as electrical power and 
telephone grids could be achieved by replacing the systems now in use with 
underground networks or by protecing the networks above ground. Such 
procedures are generally considered too costly for practical consideration. 
Advancing technology may eventually reduce the EMP as a threat to the 
telephone as copper conductors are replaced by optical fibers. However, 
optical fiber systems have terminals and repeaters which must also be 
hardened. 
Military hardening began in aircraft strategically important in conducting 
a retaliatory strike or serving as an aerial command post. This includes 
most aircraft in the Strategic Air Command. Unhardened aircraft in which the 
pilot's input to the control surfaces is electronic ("fly-by-wirew) may be 
disabled by the EMP, but there are only a few of these. 
Further hardening is now underway to protect surface installations and 
military communication networks. Continuity of electric power in missile 
launching facilities is being assured by the installation of fuel cells as 
well as auxiliary generators. Optical fiber cables are replacing 
conventional telephone networks for local communication. Information on the 
hardening status of long distance military communication networks is not 
available. 
Since total hardening of civil and military resources against EMP is not 
possible, decisions on protection must weigh threat assessment, cost, and 
consequences. In the case of the military, the deterrent value of an immune 
retaliatory force is also a consideration. 
Issues 
1. The number of space-capable launchers increases with time and some may 
become commercially available during this decade. Can a threat assessment be 
made of the prospect of a hostile nation or group inflicting an EMP in the 
manner of a terrorist blow, not as an opening to war? 
2. Should governing bodies be encouraged to protect their own computer 
capabilities and magnetically recorded data? Should financial institutions 
and communication .networks? 
3. Should systems of protective packaging for electronic goods be 
developed and their use encouraged? 
4. Should industrial and public educational programs be initiated which 
encourage hardening of electronic circuitry in vehicles, factory equipment 
and possibly in the home? 
5. When a power plant generator is started, it will not produce current 
until an outside electrical source is applied to initiate the formation of 
its magnetic field. Once formed the generator sustains its own field. This 
means that in a total shut down, the plant remains off-line until electricity 
can be brought in from another plant or generator. Have utilities made 
adequate provision to reduce down time in the event of widespread total 
shut-downs (such as by keeping small auxiliary generators on hand)? 
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6. Should the replacement of copper telephone lines with cables of optical 
fiber, at least over trunk lines, be encouraged or somehow accelerated? 
7. To what extent should orbiting equipment, civil as,well as military, be 
protected against SGEMP? - 
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